Ph.D., HarvardComparative Politics, Political Methodology
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Daniel W. Gingerich is Associate Professor of Politics specializing in comparative politics. His research focuses on understanding the causes and consequences of corruption and clientelism in Latin America as well as developing new methodologies to study these phenomena. Gingerich has published articles in journals such as Political Analysis, the Quarterly Journal of Political Science, the British Journal of Political Science, Economics and Politics, and the Journal of Theoretical Politics. He is the author of Political Institutions and Party-Directed Corruption in South America: Stealing for the Team (Cambridge University Press, series: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions). This book was selected as runner-up for the 2014 William H. Riker Book Award by the Political Economy Section of the American Political Science Association, awarded to “the best book on political economy published during the past three calendar years.” Gingerich is also the sole principal investigator on a large scale, NSF funded project entitled “Can Institutions Cure Clientelism? Assessing the Impact of the Australian Ballot in Brazil.” (SES-1119908). This project provides a rigorous examination of how the transition from the nominal to effective secret vote shapes the nature of political representation by focusing on the historical experience of Brazil before and after the Australian Ballot (AB) was introduced in this county. Prior to coming to Virginia, Gingerich held a fellowship at Princeton's Center for the Study of Democratic Politics. During the 2012-2013 academic year, he was a Visiting Scholar in the Research Department of the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington, DC.
Political Institutions and Party-Directed Corruption in South America: Stealing for the Team. 2013. Cambridge University Press (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions). [runner-up, 2014 William H. Riker Book Award]
Brokered Politics in Brazil: An Empirical Analysis. 2014. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 9 (3): 269-300 (lead article).
Yesterday's Heroes, Today's Villains: Ideology, Corruption, and Democratic Performance. 2014. Journal of Theoretical Politics 26 (2): 249-282.
The Endurance and Eclipse of the Controlled Vote: A Formal Model of Vote Brokerage under the Secret Ballot (co-authored with Luis F. Medina) 2013. Economics and Politics 25 (3): 453-480.
Governance Indicators and the Level of Analysis Problem: Empirical Findings from South America. 2013. British Journal of Political Science 43 (3): 505-540.
Understanding Off-the-Books Politics: Conducting Inference on the Determinants of Sensitive Behavior with Randomized Response Surveys. 2010. Political Analysis 18: 349-380.
Corruption and Political Decay: Evidence from Bolivia. 2009. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 4 (1): 1-34.
Ballot Structure, Political Corruption, and the Performance of Proportional Representation. 2009. Journal of Theoretical Politics 21 (4): 1-33. Reprinted in Michael Johnston, ed. Public Sector Corruption (Sage, 2010).
Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities in the Macroeconomy: An Empirical Assessment.” (co-authored with Peter Hall) 2009. British Journal of Political Science 39: 449-482. Reprinted in Bob Hanké, ed. Debating Varieties of Capitalism: A Reader (Oxford University Press, 2009).
Chapters in edited volumes/non-peer reviewed articles:
Randomized Response: Foundations and New Developments. 2015. Comparative Politics Newsletter (The Organized Section in Comparative Politics of the American Political Science Association) 25 (1): 16-27.
Bolivia: Traditional Parties, the State, and the Toll of Corruption. 2010. In Charles Blake and Steven Morris, eds., Corruption and Politics in Latin America: National and Regional Dynamics. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 55-88.
Can Institutions Cure Clientelism? Assessing the Impact of the Australian Ballot in Brazil.
When to Protect? Integrating Protected and Direct Responses in Surveys of Sensitive Behavior.
Corruption as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Costa Rica.